Category Archives: Law: Constitutional Law

US Attorney General nominee Michael Mukasey has written a very lawyerly letter to the Senate Judiciary committee. The letter fails to use the word “waterboarding” although the acceptance of a cast-iron prohibition on “torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment” might fairly be seen to cover banning it. The letter might be enough to peel off a few votes on the torture issue.

If you read the letter with any care, however, you will see that it very carefully refuses to say that — even in the face of the FISA legislation occupying the field — the the law can place any limits on a President who decides to wiretap US citizens, in the US, without a warrant, so long as he decides he wants to and is willing to wave the bloody shirt of national security.

This is a strikingly odd position to take in this letter, as the case against those wiretaps is based on both constitutional text and a statute, elements which sufficed to get Mukasey to unbend enough to say that both torture and not-quite-torture are illegal.

If the Senate confirms him after this, they're complicit in undermining the Constitution. Again.

The letter may, however, represent a fine-grained political judgment that there's no way for the administration to win on torture (and this is the most graceful way to lose) but that there's political capital to be had by being seen to be 'tough' on 'terror' — and that almost no one really cares about the Fourth Amendment anyway.

Orin Kerr has a thoughtful analysis of yesterday's decision in Mayfield v. United States.

I think Orin has a very strong take on the standing issue — the issue bothered me when I read the decision, and he crystallized what bothered me. I don't know enough about the criminal justice system to know to what extent if any this case differs from the (IMHO wrongly decided) Los Angeles v. Lyons case, but unless the plaintiff's lawyers can do a better job explaining why than the judge did, I think the government stands a good chance of winning on this issue at whichever higher court hears the case last.

And that's a shame. Orin sees the merits as a murky issue given the precedents, especially the Keith case, which is a fair point. Nonetheless, I see this as a pretty clear case given the underlying Constitutional principles. And I have to wonder what set of reasonably likely facts would ever give a plaintiff standing to make these claims in a post-Lyons world.

Being the sort of person who believes that in a constitutional system of government there is no legal right without a remedy (the very idea of 'right' being synonymous to me with 'claim to a remedy' and being disjoint from any issue of natural right which is an utterly separate issue), I am not at all comfortable — indeed gravely dislike — legal doctrines which shield alleged intrusions on our rights from judicial determination. Even if the court were to rule against my view on the merits, I think that's better than ducking behind ahistorical and unjustified standing rules.

There's maybe just enough in the facts here to let a court that wanted to make some new exception to existing standing rules — which are already not that coherent. But I don't see Justice Kennedy as a likely person to do that.

U.S. District Judge Ann Aiken of Oregon ruled that 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804 and 1823, as amended by the Patriot Act, are unconstitutional because they allow search warrants to be issued without probable cause.

Full 44-page opinion in Mayfield v. United States for those who want their news unfiltered.

(Thanks to JST for the tip.)

Someone asks,

Suppose Bush were to decide that a confirmation fight (or even just a hearing) over Gonzales's successor would be too painful, and a recess appointment too controversial. Does he have to nominate anyone? Or can he go through the rest of his Administration with Solicitor General Clement as an interim AG? Are there any powers that a confirmed Attorney General has that an interim Attorney General doesn't? Are there any steps that the Senate or anyone else can take in the event of that eventuality?

As far as I know, an acting Attorney General has all the powers of a confirmed Attorney General; the difference is political, not legal.

Although there is no way that Congress can force the President to exercise his appointment power, I suppose it would be possible for Congress to condition the exercise certain powers of the Attorney General on there being a confirmed holder of the office. I don't think it would be good policy — in fact I think it would be very bad policy to leave the country unable to do things that need doing — but offhand I can't see a constitutional obstacle to such a statute.

There is also a very weird Constitutional argument that might be brought into play but I think it would —- and should — fail. But here it is anyway:

The Solicitor General is appointed by the President by and with the consent of the Senate, as is the Attorney General. But under Article II, Section 2, paragraph two of the Constitution, there are (at least) two kinds of major Presidential appointees: “Officers of the United States” and “Inferior Officers”. The full “Officers” require Senate confirmation; Congress can waive the confirmation requirement for the “inferior” kind. If Senate confirmation has been waived, then only the President, or courts, or “Heads of Department” (usually understood to mean Officers) can appoint “inferior officers”. Let's assume that the Attorney General appoints an “inferior officer” who then makes a decision altering the rights, duties, or responsibilities of someone willing to sue (thus solving the standing issue).

The aggrieved person could argue that the Solicitor General is only a mere “inferior officer” himself — one for whom, as it happened, Congress had not waived the confirmation requirement, but for whom it could if it so chose. If this were correct, any “inferior officer” appointed by the acting Attorney General (himself an inferior officer) held that office illegally and his decisions are null and void.

But is this a good argument? I'm somewhat dubious.

First, one would have to argue that even if the Solicitor General were an inferior officer ordinarily, his being the acting Head of Department didn't give him the necessary appointing power for constitutional purposes by virtue of his acting status. This part of the argument takes us to unchartered waters. Some formalists would argue that a department head is a department head. Other formalists would argue that status comes at the time of appointment. A structuralist would worry that if the President could place non-officers into officer positions in this manner it would undermine the separation of powers. Traditionalists might say that we've often let acting officials run things, and we should be mindful of the need to have a working government would likely carry the day. Being a structuralist at heart, I think the argument here isn't bad — but it all depends on the Solicitor General being “inferior” in the first place.

And this second part of the argument seems much more doubtful. One would also have to convince a court that the Solicitor General wasn't an “officer of the United States” in his own right. That's far from obvious.

There is no bright line between the two types of appointees. We do know that Cabinet officers like the Attorney General are unquestionably “Officers” and that the Special Prosecutor under the now-lapsed statute authorizing them was — barely — an “inferior officer”.

The argument that the Solicitor General is only “inferior,” relies on the facts that he reports to the AG, and is actually the number four official in the DoJ pecking order. No court has ever held that reporting to someone rather than directly to the President is a necessary element of “officerness” but then again no court has ever held otherwise, so the argument remains open. Plus, since the Attorney General is only #4, calling him an “officer” would suggest very strongly that there are four “officers” in the DoJ, and several in every other cabinet department as well; that sounds like a lot.

But given the long history and tradition of the office of Solicitor General, I don't think most courts would find it very difficult to say that the Solicitor General was an “officer”. The Solicitor General has important powers and responsibilities over litigation, including the power to “confess judgment” — throw in the towel on appeal before the Supreme Court for a case the government won below. The office of Solicitor General dates back to 1870, and has a long and generally admirable tradition of independence, so much so that the Solicitor General is sometimes called the “tenth Justice”. I think the Solicitor General is probably an “officer” in his own right, and regardless of what I think, I'm pretty sure most courts and Justices would see it that way.

In short, no, I think there's no legal reason the Solicitor General can't be acting Attorney General for a long, long time. Even so, I predict that the he won't be.

Secrecy News brings word of a really interesting state secrets decision from the DC Circuit:

In an unusual move that may signal a new, more discriminating judicial view of the state secrets privilege, a federal appeals court has reinstated (pdf) a lawsuit which a lower court had dismissed after the government invoked the state secrets privilege.

The lawsuit was originally filed in 1994 by former Drug Enforcement Administration official Richard Horn who alleged that the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency had unlawfully eavesdropped on his communications while he was stationed in Rangoon, Burma.

The government asserted the state secrets privilege in 2000 and moved for dismissal of the case. The government motion was granted by the D.C. district court (pdf) in 2004.

But in a June 29, 2007 decision (that was unsealed on July 20), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the dismissal. The Court did not dispute the government's invocation of the state secrets privilege, but concluded that there was sufficient unprivileged evidence on the record to permit the plaintiff to argue his case.

“In many state secrets cases, a plaintiff has no prospects of evidence to support the assertions in his complaint and this lack of evidence requires dismissal. Here, however, Horn [the plaintiff] is not without evidence,” the Court said.

The Court presented its ruling as a straightforward application of established principles, including fairness to the parties.

But in a sharply dissenting opinion, one conservative member of the Court said that the decision to reinstate the lawsuit could fundamentally alter the use of the state secrets privilege.

“The majority's reversal of the district court's decision,” wrote Judge Janice Rogers Brown, “pushes this circuit's state secrets jurisprudence in a new and troubling direction — one at odds with all other circuits that have considered the issue.”

The case was remanded to the district court level for further deliberation.

See the unsealed Appeals Court ruling “In Re: Sealed Case,” June 29, 2007.

Note that Janice Rogers Brown is on every short list of Republicans whom the Administration might seek to promote if a Supreme Court seats opens up. And that she's seriously extreme.