Category Archives: Law: Constitutional Law

A Word on the Rep. McKinney Matter

Orrin Kerr speculates plausibly that if Rep. McKinney is charged with an offense relating to her much-disputed altercation with the Capitol Police, it will be a simple misdemeanor, but that it won’t happen

Will the U.S. Attorney’s Office charge McKinney with a federal crime? If she is charged, I gather the offense would be a misdemeanor simple assault under 18 U.S.C. 111(a) or 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(5). I don’t know who makes these sorts of calls within the U.S. Attorney’s Office, or what kinds of cases the U.S. Attorney’s Office in D.C. tends to pursue. As a result, I can only offer amateurish speculation. My amateurish speculation, for what it’s worth, is that the U.S. Attorney’s Office will decline prosecution. Three major reasons: First, McKinney was apparently on official business as a member of Congress at the time, and was well within her rights to enter the building without passing through the metal detectors. Second, the officer apparently wasn’t hurt. Third, the story is already a media circus, and will only become much more of a circus if McKinney is charged.

All that makes sense, but I see it differently: I think it’s a felony or nothing. Why? Art. I, sec. 6 of the Constitution privileges Representatives’ and Senators’ access to the chamber:

They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.

For reasons sounding in British history, it was thought important that the executive branch lack the power to block members’ access to the floor. Thus, unless the US Attorney is willing to charge McKinney with felony assault — not an obvious charge under the circumstances — I predict she will win any trial on Constitutional grounds.

It’s true that grabbing hold of McKinney was not an “arrest” in the most common modern sense of “you are going to jail” but it was an “arrest” in the sense of “halting your progress”. (For what little it’s worth, the first OED entry for the noun form of arrest is “The act of standing still, halting, or stopping; stoppage, stop, halt, delay.”) And it’s clear to me that the goal of this Constitutional provision is unimpeded access for our lawmakers — allowing the police to block entry to the Capitol without actually dragging Congresspersons off to the hoosegow would gut this important guarantee that the the executive may not prevent the legislature from meeting.

PS. Might you call it “breach of the peace”? I don’t think so – it’s undisputed that she didn’t start it, and if the cops can stop a Representative who in protesting becomes a “breach of the peace”….

Posted in Law: Constitutional Law | 16 Comments

The Legal Equivalent of a ‘Hail Mary’ Pass

I haven’t the energy to go into any detail this evening, but I thought I would just mention that at least based on the news reports, the latest argument to emerge from Scooter Libby’s lawyers, Libby’s Lawyers Say Prosecutor Acted Unconstitutionally, smacks of desperation.

I’d have to read the actual brief to be sure, but the general legal area in which arguments of this sort fall is territory I teach and write in. The Supreme Court held in 1988, in Morrison v. Olson, that a special prosecutor with far more independence than Fitzgerald — one appointed under the old special prosecutor law which has since lapsed — was not an unconstitutional actor. That 7-1 decision has been criticized in hindsight, and only two Justices who participated remain on the Court, including Scalia who wrote a fiery dissent, which may be what prompted this challenge. The trouble is that — unless of course there’s a surprise in the brief — in order for this argument to work you’d not only have to get the Supreme Court to overturn the Morrison decision, which is conceivable if unlikely, but then also get that revised logic to apply to a set of facts that amount to a much, much weaker case for a separation of powers violation — which I think is just not gonna happen.

Update: Fuller Washington Post story.

Posted in Law: Constitutional Law | 4 Comments

For Federal Jurisdiction Mavens

Constitutional law and federal jurisdiction mavens (but not too many others?) will definitely want to read Steve Vladeck’s latest post on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, inspired by a special concurrence in the 11th Circuit’s consideration of the Schiavo case.

Ordinarily, I’d worry about junior faculty pouring out so much smarts into ‘mere’ blog posts, but Steve has so much to spare….

Posted in Law: Constitutional Law | Comments Off on For Federal Jurisdiction Mavens

A Constitutional Law Scavenger Hunt With A Serious Purpose

Around the country, law students who study Constitutional Law in the Fall sone will be studying for their finals; not long afterwards, those who study it in Spring will start up their course. So it’s as good a time as any to list the questions that, back in the days I used teach Constitutional Law I, I used to ask my students during the first week of class.

Some of these questions are very easy (although even in those cases, the answers may surprise you); some only appear to be. Others are inspired by real and difficult cases; a few illustrate doctrines of constitutional interpretation, some more controversial than others. And perhaps one or two don’t have answers, or at least not answers that everyone agrees to. Which is remarkably odd given the simplicity of most of these questions….

Read The US Constitution, and the Amendments then take the quiz…

Continue reading

Posted in Law: Constitutional Law, Law: Reading the Constitution | 18 Comments

A Vote for Unreviewable Injustice

The Senate did a bad thing yesterday, voting for the so-called Graham Amendment, 49-42 (with McCain voting for it), which would eliminate the statutory right of habeas corpus for alien detainees held by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo. The point of this amendment is to undermine the Supreme Court’s June 2004 decision in Rasul v. Bush.

For an explanation of the issues see Marty Lederman at SCOTUS Blog and then see Steve Vladeck for the advanced course in the horrible and complex federal courts and constitutional law implications.

Amazingly, the proposal has a (tentative) academic supporter, Julian Ku, at Opinio Juris.

Posted in Guantanamo, Law: Constitutional Law | 5 Comments

Circuit Justice Roberts’s Eleven-and-a-Half-Day-Gap

Did Chief Justice Roberts accidentally create grounds for reopening (and even rearguing) Banner v. United States?

Here’s the argument:

This case is an appeal decided today [Hat Tip to How Appealing for the link] by a panel consisting of Chief Justice Roberts, sitting as a Circuit Justice, and D.C. Circuit Judges Edwards and Rogers. Chief Justice Roberts is the judge formerly known as "Circuit Judge Roberts," who was originally assigned to hear the appeal in that capacity, along with Edwards and Rogers.

On September 29, 2005, Circuit Judge Roberts took the oath of office as Chief Justice of the United States. And we can only presume that at that point, if not before, he effectively resigned his commission as U.S. Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia Circuit. Indeed, the Federal Judicial Center website states, in its entry for "Circuit Judge Roberts," that Roberts’s "[s]ervice terminated on September 29, 2005, due to appointment to another judicial position."

On October 11, 2005, the Supreme Court issued an order assigning Chief Justice Roberts to be Circuit Justice for the D.C. Circuit. Under 28 U.S.C. § 43(b), "Each Court of Appeals shall consist of the circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service. The circuit justice and justices or judges designated or assigned shall be competent to sit as judges of the court." So, in plain English, Chief Justice Roberts was a member of the circuit at the time of the opinion—i.e., today.

The problem, however, is that Roberts does not appear to have been a member of the circuit, either as a circuit judge or as a circuit Justice, between the date he left the court (September 29) and the date of the circuit Justice assignment order (October 11). What’s more, it’s not clear how, when he "rejoined" the court, he also rejoined the panel. After all, the normal procedure on most circuits (and, we presume, the D.C. Circuit) when a vacancy arises is either to leave the third seat vacant since the two remaining judges constitute a quorum, or to randomly assign a third judge.

This may seem like pedantry, but it was this very kind of punctilio that forced the Supreme Court to vacate a whole slew of criminal convictions affirmed by an "improperly constituted" Ninth Circuit panel in Nguyen v. United States in 2003. In Nguyen, the Court held that the presence of a judge who was not a duly constituted member of the court was grounds to invalidate any decision in which he participated, even when the remaining two judges would have constituted a quorum and would have chosen the same outcome.

It is certainly possible that the proper order reassigning Circuit Justice Roberts to the original panel does exist, and was filed by the Clerk of the D.C. Circuit. We have been able to find no such order, however, on the D.C. Circuit’s website, and a cursory search of the PACER docket summary for Banner reveals none. If there was indeed no such order, it certainly appears as if the losing party has a good claim that the panel decision is voidable under Nguyen.

In a subsequent post (which we hope never to write), we’ll explain whether Chief Justice Roberts would have to recuse from the cert. petition from the reargument, since he would no longer be a member of the panel below.

[Co-authored by Michael Froomkin and Steve Vladeck for cross-posting on PrawfsBlawg and Discourse.net, as an unfortunate result of our offices being close together.]

Posted in Law: Constitutional Law, Law: The Supremes | 11 Comments