Category Archives: Law: Constitutional Law

A War Powers Amendment?

Stirling Newberry, whose ideas I often like, has penned an odd one. I think I sort of like the idea behind it, but the execution leaves the lawyer in me very unsatisfied. Here’s his proposal for a War Powers Amendment:

Article 1

It shall require a three fifths vote of the whole of both houses to declare war, or authorize the use of war powers. Congress may revoke a declaration of war, or of any specific war power, by three fifths vote of the whole of both houses, to take effect not less than 30 days from the date of the vote.

Article 2

The authorization for the use of war powers shall expire thirty days from the beginning of a new Congress, unless reauthorized by a majority of the whole of both houses.

Article 3

Should the President use force or fraud directed at the Congress for the purpose of attaining a declaration of war or war powers, he shall be removed following a vote of a three fifths of the Senate, if impeached by the House. The President may appeal this removal to the Supreme Court.

Well.

Art. 1 runs into the problem that we have lots of non-war wars. Also “war powers” – while there is an overly-vague war powers resolution, “war powers” is not a term with a constitutional definition. Are you going to trust courts to define it? Endless wrangles, and always while bullets and worse are flying. The executive will win.

Art. 2 is to me the most interesting, but would only work with a much more robust definition of what uses of force are war powers and what are not (is UN peacekeeping ‘war powers’? Responding to a security council request for troops? Emergency rescue of US citizens in a war zone? Shipping supplies to an ally engaged in a fight? Spying?)

But whatever one thinks of 1 & 2 the third article is a big mistake. Any time you have two procedures for something you have the possibility of people getting into procedural wrangles about which applies, how they differ, etc. If we want to impeach a President, better to have him out than have wrangles and pretenders to the throne. Second, you shouldn’t give the Supreme Court a standardless power of review. According to what standard is this review – de novo? abuse of discretion? What sorts of claims lie – denial of due process? ex parte communications? And having original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court creates some (surmountable but real) difficulties if there is a need to take testimony; the absence of a process for that might lead some to think the review was deferential, like the review of an administrative agency on its own record, or even more deferential than that.

Trying to stop things like the Tonkin Gulf Resolution or the even more open-ended and disasterous Iraq resolution is certainly a good idea, maybe even a great idea. But count this as just a first draft of a long drafting process.

Posted in Law: Constitutional Law | 8 Comments

Someone Knows The Answer to This Question About the Koso Statutory Rape Prosecution

Law professors tend to specialize. As a result, there are lots of legal things I don’t know much about, and I try not to write about them. And there are lots of legal things I think I know something about, but I usually feel I don’t know them well enough to opine publicly. And on those few subjects I think I know best, I tend to want to write fairly long and detailed articles, not blog posts. As a consequence, I don’t tend to post legal (as opposed to political) commentary on this blog. The major exception so far has been the torture issue, which so offended me that I studied up on it to the point where I felt able to write about it, even though I don’t currently have plans to publish on it in law journals.

But here’s an exception to my rule, this time on a subject I know I don’t know well: family law (and its criminal law counterpart). It’s just that I’m curious about it.

The New York Times ran a story yesterday about a statutory rape charge being filed in Nebraska against one Matthew Koso, who is part of a couple (he: age 22, she: age 14) legally married in Kansas. The article doesn’t mention the constitutional implications at all, nor it seems does much of the blog commentary, and I’d like to know why. (Just keep in mind as you read this that I’m prepared to be told that any of the following assertions is wrong.)

I would have thought that it was settled that under the privacy jurisprudence in the Griswold line of cases (striking down a state rule banning sales of contraceptives to married persons) no state could criminalize sex between consenting married adults, even due to their ages. I presume therefore that Nebraska law doesn’t recognize the validity of the Kansas marriage, but I would have thought that this failure to recognize would violate the full faith and credit clause of the constitution:

“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”

In the so-called “Defense of Marriage Act” Congress purported to exercise its authority under the Full Faith and Credit Clause…to allow states to deny any credit to out-of-state marriages between same-sex couples. But–even assuming that this statute conforms to the Full Faith and Credit Clause (I’m dubious)–it’s clear that the DOMA doesn’t apply here. So what is Nebraska’s authority for denying the validity of the Kansas marriage? Is it ‘public policy’? Can that suffice to void a constitutionally protected relationship? Or is it some idea that minors don’t have the same constitutional right to marry as adults, and this trumps the adult’s right not to be prosecuted for marital sex?

I’m presume there’s some good reason why the couple’s defenders, including their lawyer, are not making these constitutional arguments. Alternately, they might be making them but it’s not getting reported. Or, perhaps the prosecution iis to be based on a res ipsa loquitor claim regarding pre-marital sex?

Like I said, family law is not my field, and the facts are not utterly clear here, but I bet someone reading this either knows the answer or knows where it can be found.

Posted in Law: Con Law: Marriage, Law: Constitutional Law, Law: Criminal Law | 18 Comments

Appeals court strikes down “partial-birth” abortion law — for now

The first appellate court decision concerning a federal law called the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 came down on Friday. In it, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit struck down the law as unconstitutional.

Here's the story: Five years ago, in a case called Stenberg v. Carhart, the Supreme Court invalidated a Nebraska law banning all so-called “partial birth” abortions. In a situation where a woman has the constitutional right to seek an abortion, the Supreme Court majority reasoned, a state may not regulate the method of her abortion in a way that endangers her health. Specifically, “where a significant body of medical opinion believes [an abortion] procedure may bring with it greater safety for some patients,” the state may not ban that procedure unless the ban incorporates an exception to cover those cases in which, medically, the banned procedure is the best approach. The Court canvassed the views of medical groups. It didn't find a consensus among doctors that, as plaintiffs argued, the banned procedures would be the safest for some patients. It didn't find a consensus the other way either, though: There was no consensus that the banned procedures couldn't sometimes be the safest approach for a pregnant woman. Bottom line: doctors disagreed. That risk that the state might be banning a sometimes-medically-necessary procedure, said the Court, was enough to require the state to write a exception into the law — and it hadn't, so the law was unconstitutional. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas dissented.

Congress responded by enacting a new, nationwide ban. It explained in the statute that there was a “moral, medical, and ethical consensus” that the covered procedures were not only “gruesome and inhumane,” but indeed “never medically necessary.” The Stenberg v. Carhart decision, Congressional leaders explained, was irrelevant: The Court had announced legal consequences following from its medical uncertainty, but in fact there was no uncertainty. The Court's understanding about the possible medical desirability of the procedure had been superseded by Congress' declaration that the procedure was never medically in the interests of any patient.

The Eighth Circuit, on Friday, disagreed. The Supreme Court's earlier decision, it said, had dispositively established that there was a dispute among doctors over whether the procedure was sometimes medically desirable. Congress couldn't change that simply by announcing a consensus.

There's a bunch going on here that's interesting. The Court in Stenberg v. Carhart had responded to uncertainty by insisting that Indiana could not take the risk of banning a treatment that might (it didn't know) in some cases prove to be the safest choice. Congress responded that it didn't see the matter as at all uncertain, and that its own sureness should govern. For now, though, the most important thing to say about the Eighth Circuit's decision is that it's probably really short-lived. Only four of the Justices who voted with the Stenberg v. Carhart majority are still there. Justice O'Connor, of course, was the fifth.

Posted in Law: Constitutional Law | 6 Comments

Wickard Lives!

Federal Authorities May Prosecute Medical Use of Marijuana.

Forced to choose between its anti-federalism jurisprudence and the War On (Some) Drugs™, the Supreme Court has chosen to re-affirm Wickard v. Filburn's expansive view of federal regulatory power over the national economy. As a result, less of what I taught students in Con Law I ten years ago is obsolete than I might have guessed.

Full text of decisions in Ashcroft v. Raich.

Much as I'm not wild about the specific outcome as social policy, I think this decision is fully consistent with Chief Justice Marshall's view of the evolving Constitution. But it's flatly inconsistent with the modern Federalist Society view. Academic fireworks will now ensue.

Posted in Law: Constitutional Law | 6 Comments

The Thorn in the Rose

At first blush, the proposal at davidshcess.com [seen via Ascription is an Anathema to any Enthusiasm] sounds so sensible: Tired of originalists like Justice Scalia going on about how the Eighth Amendment only prohibits punishments that were cruel and unusual in 1791, and hence the death penalty (and maybe chopping off ears, and certainly stockading) are constitutional today? Want to do something about them? Just introduce a new constitutional amendment re-enacting the Eighth. No one would dare vote against it (are you for cruel and unusual punishment?) and it would re-set the clock to modern times (are you for cutting off ears?).

But in fact, it's a rotten idea. It surrenders a key point of principle. I am, in the main, relatively sympathetic to at least a weak form of originalism. If words don't have meanings that we can collectively ascribe to them, with some consistency over time, then constitutional government is a bit of a farce. I'd like to avoid that, for all that Senators Frist and Santorum are determined to make it difficult.

But in the originalist constitution I read, there's not only play in the joints, but in some cases an invitation to evolve. It's not everywhere. The requirement that the President be 35 isn't a requirement that s/he have the relative wisdom and maturity of a 35 year old in 1783, or have lived an equivalent fraction of the average life expectancy. It's that the person be 35. On the other hand, some parts of the Constitution do read like invitations to change with the times. ('It is a Constitution we are expounding here' after all.) And the cruel and unusual clause is definitely one of them. So there's no need to re-set the clock on cruelty — it's always ticking. And it would be wrong to provide such luscious ammunition to those who suggest otherwise.

Posted in Law: Constitutional Law | 7 Comments

Questions the Veep Should Answeer

Paul Gowder Horwitz has a very interesting set of comments at PrawfsBlawg: The Filibuster, the Constitution Outside the Courts, and the Press's Failure. A taste:

What is disappointing is that Cheney has, essentially, been allowed to maintain near perfect silence on the question of whether and why it is unconstitutional to filibuster judicial nominees.  Nor, for reasons I hope I have demonstrated, is it enough to stop there?  What constitutional conclusions has he reached on all these other questions?  The failure of the press to push for answers on these questions is really disappointing — inexcusable, in fact.  It is also disappointing that the Democratic Senate caucus has not pressed him, or anyone, on these points in a sustained and public way.

What accounts for this silence?  I don't think it is simply that this level of detail is reserved for law geeks.  I think it says something about how we think about the Constitution as applied outside the courts.  The prevailing assumption from day one, I think, has been that the Vice President would simply come to the aid of his party.  Thus, the Majority Leader assumed the rule change could happen, the press assumed the same thing, and the Democrats didn't fight hard on the constitutional point but focused instead on the nucelar option specter.

But a vote by the presiding officer of the Senate (who, it is generally assumed, will also be the Vice President) is not a political vote.  At least it is not supposed to be.  It decides a constitutional question — and one that, at that, would likely be insulated from judicial review.  The Vice President, along with the members of the Senate, takes an oath to “support this Constitution,” and we ought to assume he takes it seriously.  That means that, finally, only his views will matter — not those of Senator Frist, or his lawyers, or the public, or even the President.  Whether liberal or conservative, most lawyers (and citizens) assume that a judge who cast a vote on a constitutional question purely as a matter of expediency would be dishonoring his office: that judge must decide what the Constitution means, and vote accordingly, without regard to his personal preferences.  Is the same any less true of any other government officer faced with the duty of interpreting the Constitution?  In short, the failure to press Cheney for a principled explanation of his position on the constitutionality of the filibuster of judicial nominees, and of all other filibusters, is inexcusable.

Posted in Law: Constitutional Law, The Media | 5 Comments