Peter Shane, What Do We Call Options Worse Than “Nuclear?”
Interestingly, every Constitutional stratagem he comes up with for forcing or blocking a Supreme Court nominee seems to have a possible counter-move for the other side. The Constitution really is pretty finely balanced until the Supreme Court mucks it up with decisions like Noel Canning.
The government’s attempt to get Apple to build a bespoke operating system so they can brute force access to an iPhone without it erasing its data has led the media to some of us who were in the first round of the crypto wars. Today was my turn. A few seconds on CBS in the Morning, ink in a nice explainer by Steve Lohr in the New York Times. I also spoke to the LA Times and the Wall St. Journal, but I haven’t seen what if anything they made of it.
I presume they found me because I wrote the first US legal article on law and encryption: The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip and the Constitution. There’s also a shorter sequel that some find easier to read, It Came From Planet Clipper.
The Apple case potentially raises at least these major legal issues:
Although the Apple issue likely will be decided on non-constitutional grounds, the parties are making a record on the constitutional issues with an eye to a set of appeals that could go as far as the Supreme Court. The issues are important and interesting, so the media is right to treat this as a big deal.
Suppose that one became convinced that a member of the Supreme Court was a racist, or had a bias either in favor of a particular religion or against a particular religious view. Would any of these constitute grounds for impeachment and conviction?
Would your answer to this question turn on whether the views manifested in judicial opinions, or only in in-court colloquies, or only in out-of-court writing or speaking?
I am confident that in a just world, the answer should be “no”. But we don’t always live in a just world. I wish I had time to write a careful analysis, but I don’t, so here are some first thoughts. Corrections and amplifications welcomed.
UPDATE: This is why I should never blog from memory, at least pre-coffee. This morning I conflated the right to move about within a state — not a clearly established federal right, cf. the aftermath of Katrina — with the right to move about between states, which is quite well established: Sáenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) held that a classification (here, lesser welfare benefits for new residents in their first year) that has the effect of imposing penalty on the right to travel violates the Equal Protection Clause absent a compelling governmental interest. What’s more the Court defined the right to travel interstate as having three parts: the right to enter and leave another State; the right to be treated as a welcome visitor while temporarily present in another State; and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.
That ought to settle it.
Three areas of law seem relevant to the question.
First, immigration law, which is a matter of only federal concern. States do not in any way get to control movement across the international border. So if the feds want to let refugees into the US, they are admitted to the US. Even at airports in states that say they don’t want refugees.
Second, anti-discrimination law. Here, we find more of a patchwork. Rather than a single federal statute prohibiting national origin discrimination, we have a collection of piecemeal legislation. It might be that none of the usual anti-discrimination laws, which are aimed at things like housing and employment, speak to the issue of free movement between states.
Third, and not least, there is the Equal Protection clause of the Constitution, backed up by § 1983 of the federal code (§ 1983 prohibits the deprivation of constitutional and federal statutory rights by persons acting under “color of law”). As I understand it, neither the Equal Protection Clause nor any other part of the Constitution has been definitively held by the courts to create a right of free movement between states. [Note the update above – should be “within” not “between”.] Thus, at least at the Supreme Court level, it is technically an open question whether a state might close its borders to everyone. (The question arose after authorities closed a bridge preventing escape from areas of New Orleans hit by Hurricane Katrina. I have some doubts that a state could seal its border legally other than briefly in response to an emergency, but again, if memory serves the Supreme Court hasn’t prohibited that in so many words.) What is not at doubt, however, is that if a state were to attempt some sort of border control, it must do so in a manner that does not discriminate invidiously. (If they are searching for a White Toyota, it is not invidious to only stop White Toyotas.) The state may not treat its own inhabitants better than those of other states. And it may not discriminate on grounds of race or any other suspect class. I would presume national origin is such a class; whether immigration status qualifies (if only a proxy for national origin) is a little trickier, but I’d hope so.
Somewhat related: Important Freedom to Travel Decision From the DC Circuit (7/11/09); Plenty of Blame to Go Round (IV) (9/11/05)
Here, via Marty Lederman, is the opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel underlying President Obama’s new ‘deferred action policy’ on certain classes of undocumented immigrants.
Spoiler alert: the President is exercising powers delegated to him by Congress plus a dose of prosecutorial discretion. This really isn’t as if a future President were to say, “we will not enforce the estate tax.”
Jotwell Blenderlaw
