Category Archives: National Security

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen Takes a Star Turn as GOP Policy Weathervane

Words cannot express my joy at being represented in Congress by this paragon of consistency and statecraft that is Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. Why, just consider the warm fuzzy feeling one gets from reading stories like this:

House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, R-Fla., endorsed a no-fly zone in a Feb. 26th press release when she said “stronger penalties must be imposed in order to hold the regime accountable for its heinous crimes, and to prevent further violence against the Libyan people. Additional U.S. and international measures should include the establishment and enforcement of a no-fly zone…”

But after the President imposed the no-fly zone, on March 20th, Ros-Lehtinen had concerns which she expressed in a new press release.

“I am concerned that the President has yet to clearly define for the American people what vital United States security interests he believes are currently at stake in Libya,” she said.

I happen to think that the second position is more sensible than the first, but wouldn’t it be nice if there were some principles (other than the destructive one of a will to power) driving the modern GOP?

(Meanwhile, three wars now. And counting.)

Posted in National Security, Politics: FL-25/FL-27, Politics: The Party of Sleaze | 1 Comment

U.S. States ‘Poorly Prepared’ For Radiation Emergency | TPMMuckraker

Apparently, we’re not very well prepared for a radiation emergency here.

The study found several gaps in states’ radiation emergency preparedness. For one, the survey reports that 73% of states “reported having minimal (53%) or no (21%) plans to conduct population-based exposure monitoring.” Meanwhile, only 13% of states surveyed reported having “any written or detailed operations plan for radiologic analyses of biological or clinical samples.” And 42% of states reported little or no planning to test first responders for radiation contamination.

“Few reported having sufficient resources to do public health surveillance, radiation exposure assessment, laboratory functions and other capabilities,” the study says.

(Previous relevant post — don’t miss the comments —We Live Near Nuclear Power Plants Too.)

Posted in Energy, National Security, Science/Medicine | Comments Off on U.S. States ‘Poorly Prepared’ For Radiation Emergency | TPMMuckraker

We Write Letters (to the WashPo Ombudsman)

Just sent this to the Washington Post’s Ombudsman:

Today’s lead editorial on the Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft case blindly repeats a piece of government propaganda that has been decisively falsified in the court proceedings of that very case.

High Court Should Overturn Kidd v. Ashcroft” begins like this:

ABDULLAH AL-KIDD was arrested at Dulles International Airport in 2003 after purchasing a one-way, first-class ticket to Saudi Arabia.

In fact, testimony and subpoenaed airline records establish that Al-Kidd had a round-trip coach ticket. The government’s false statement — originally made to the court to justify arresting him — misled the court and it is this very pattern of government misrepresentations that played a significant role in the judicial turn against immunity which the Post (in my opinion wrongly) critiques. The Post’s error is no mere detail but serves as means of obfuscating — avoiding — the central facts that undermine the argument the Post wishes to make.

I guess if you use fake facts it’s easier to write editorials in favor of unlimited and un-accountable state power to detain US citizens (AP: “Over the next 16 days he would be strip-searched repeatedly, left naked in a jail cell and shower for more than 90 minutes in view of other men and women, routinely transported in handcuffs and leg irons, and kept with people who had been convicted of violent crimes. On a long trip between jails, a federal marshal refused to unlock al-Kidd’s chains so he could use the bathroom.”).

No mere factual correction can fix this problem since that would fail to make clear that the factual change undercuts the entire logic of the editorial, but I have never yet seen a correction which makes such an admission, and don’t have much hope here.

The question for you, though, is this: how could the Post allow someone to write an editorial on such an important matter who isn’t even aware of one of the better-known facts of the case? And who doesn’t then check the facts. Or read the AP feed on the subject (2/27/11) which in addition to summarizing the vile conditions of confinement in which the government held Al-Kidd states,

But the sworn statement the FBI submitted to justify the warrant had important errors and omissions. The $5,000 one-way, first-class seat that the agents said al-Kidd purchased was, in reality, a coach-class, round-trip ticket. The statement neglected to mention that al-Kidd had been cooperative or that he was a U.S. citizen with a wife and children who also were American.

In other words, the accurate facts were and are no secret: it almost takes work to avoid them.

And one more question for you: even as the Post preaches a doctrine of no-accountability for government officials who lie about and mistreat US citizens, does it practice a similar doctrine of non-accountability for editorialists who get basic, key, facts this badly wrong? Or will there be some internal sanction?

Update:

I got this auto-reply a little while later:

I will be out of the office starting 01/31/2011 and will not return until 12/31/2011.

Thanks for writing. My two year term as ombudsman has ended and a replacement will be named soon. In the meantime, if you have questions or concerns about news coverage, I’d suggest you e-mail or call the appropriate department in the newsroom. Among them:

Local: 202-334-7300 metro@washpost.com
National: 202-334-7410 national@washpost.com
Business: 202-334-7320 business@washpost.com
Sports: 202-334-7350 sports@washpost.com
Foreign: 202-334-7400 foreign@washpost.com
Style: 202-334-7535 style@washpost.com
Obituaries: 202-334-7389 newsobits@washpost.com
Book World: 202-334-7882 bookworld@washpost.com
Food: 202-334-7575 food@washpost.com
Health: 202-334-5031 health-science@washpost.com
Travel: 202-334-7750 travel@washpost.com
Photo/video: 202-334-7380
Graphics: 202-334-7380
Post Main Number: 202-334-6000

A variety of other contact information, including e-mail links to reporters and editors, is provided through this page on The Post’s Web site: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/contactus/index.html

Letters to the Editor should be addressed to: letters@washpost.com

For circulation or delivery issues, call the subscriber services department at 202-334-6100, or homedelivery@washpost.com

-Andy Alexander

So it looks as if the Post has been Ombudsless for a month (suggesting that filling the job is not a priority, or perhaps no one good wants to touch the job with a ten foot pole). And also that the Obmudsman role doesn’t extend to editorials. I don’t know that there’s much point in sending this in as a letter to the Editor. They’ll just chop it to bits even if they run it.

Update 2: More on the Post and Ombudspersons at The Washington Post Says It has an Ombudsman.

Posted in Law: Constitutional Law, National Security, The Media | 1 Comment

Today’s Required Reading

Another Runaway General: Army Deploys Psy-Ops on U.S. Senators — Rolling Stone.

I remember back in Vietnam that some officers were said to believe that the Senate was the real enemy. But I doubt any of them went this far.

Posted in National Security | 1 Comment

How to Censor ‘A Censorship-Resistant Web’

A Censorship-Resistant Web sets out a sketch of a way to create fail-safe distributed copies of web pages (i.e. not centralized in a single point of failure like at archive.org) thought likely to suffer political risk, to authenticate them as genuinely by the original author, and to help browsers find them if the original were to vanish.

What’s nice about this system is that it gets you censorship resistance without introducing anything wildly new. There are already certificate authorities. There are already hash-to-URL servers. There are already mirrors. There’s already Tor. (There’s already tor2web.) The only really new thing specific to censorship resistance is URL-to-hash servers of the form I described, but they’re very simple and hopefully uncontroversial.

There is some work to be done stitching all of these together and improving the UI, but unlike with some other censorship-resistance systems, there’s nothing you can point to as having no good purpose except for helping bad guys. It’s all pretty basic and generally useful stuff, just put together in a new way.

(Spotted via Cory Doctorow)

I like this kind of stuff, and this seems the start of a fine effort. But it made me think, and I’m afraid that I had an evil idea.  The same techniques that allow users to navigate to the backup pages(s) also will allow the party that took down the page in the first place to find the duplicate(s), and it will rarely be hard to trace these to their respective owners.  So if this form of future-proofing becomes frequent for politically sensitive materials, I expect the cross-border aspect of the denial-to-denial-of-service-attack to be overcome by executive agreement or treaty.

The difficulty for the censor in the USA, however, is that pesky First Amendment.  I can see two ways that a determined government might try to get around it other than directly applying its scary and expansionist reading of the Espionage Act.  The first would be to argue the still-open issue regarding the supremacy of treaties over the Bill of Rights.  But that’s rather major, and would depend on the content of the hypothetical international agreement. It may also be unnecessary.

A sneakier work-around the First Amendment might go as follows:

  1. Seize the copyright of the online version.  This might be done on a claim that the text is contraband or was acquired with contraband.  Alternately, the seizure might be effected under the standard condemnation power, in which case just compensation would be due to the original owner in order to comply with the Fifth Amendment.
  2. Once the government has the copyright it then applies the DMCA to all the (domestic) copies and has them taken down.  It applies to foreign countries to do the same under the proliferating DMCA clones around the world.

There are a couple of complexities that need explanation.

First, the US government doesn’t usually claim copyright in the work product of its employees, which would make the claim that there is a copyright to seize difficult if the government was the original author of the leaked work (the WikiLeaks situation). That’s from 17 USC § 105,

Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government, but the United States government is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise.

But imagine that § 105 was amended, and the government did start to claim copyright in its employees’ works, or maybe just in all classified works produced by the government or its contractors and agents.  On the one hand, this would seem to avoid the need to seize the copyright, since the government would already have it and could instead go straight to the DMCA. 

On the other hand, however, the government would face a difficulty in that in order to claim copyright over the posted work, the government would have to admit that the work was authentic, something the US government has studiously avoided doing (officially) in the WikiLeaks case.

Perhaps, however, the government could invent some new procedure in which it went to District Court and proceeded in the alternative, saying it was either seizing the copyright, or not (leaving the question of just compensation for any subsequent proceeding in which someone claiming to have the copyright could come forward in the Court of Claims), but in either case now claimed entitlement to a declaration that it had the authority to apply the takedown clauses of the DMCA?

Anyway, all this is too horrible.  I hope a real copyright lawyer can come along and explain why it is nonsense. And by posting it on the day of the year when no one reads this blog, I hope I’ve both established priority in the unlikely event this both isn’t nonsense and is original, and also limited the chance of the idea taking off.

Posted in Cryptography, Law: Copyright and DMCA, Law: Free Speech, National Security | Comments Off on How to Censor ‘A Censorship-Resistant Web’

This Is Not a Big Deal

President Obama fired Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal today.

This is not a big deal because Obama Says Afghan Policy Won’t Change. The policy is a big deal. The identity of the General implementing it isn't (much).

Posted in National Security | 10 Comments